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ABSTRACT
Whether Kant’s account of free will is coherent or not depends upon how we interpret
him. On the one hand, if we understand Kant as providing some metaphysical solution to the
problem of free will, which secures the reality of free will for agents, then his account seems to
be incoherent. One the other hand, if we understand Kant’s account as merely providing a
defense of the assumption, or idea of freedom for practical purposes, then his account seems to
be useful and coherent. I will argue that the latter account of free will is the one that Kant
provides in his works, and will illustrate how this account might shed light on to our epistemic
limits and our nature as human beings.
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1

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I will argue that whether Kant’s account of free will is coherent or not depends
upon how we interpret him. On the one hand, if we understand his account to be some sort of
robust causal/theoretical explanation of how humans have freedom, which provides a positive
theory of free will meant to work out how free will and causal determinism or natural necessity
may be metaphysically compatible with each other or to show how, to be free, agents must exempt
themselves in some way from the natural causal order, then his account is incoherent. Interpreted
in this way, the account would face a dilemma which, to my mind, is insurmountable. On the other
hand, if we understand his account to be merely a defense of the idea of free will—one that merely
presents a conceptual framework within which we may make room for the idea of freedom—then
his account seems to be useful, and helps to deepen our understanding of ourselves. To provide a
defense of the idea of freedom in this sense, means to assume the idea of freedom and show that
no amount of theoretical knowledge of the world, or of natural necessity, shows our idea of
freedom to be impossible.
There is much to suggest that Kant takes himself to be presenting the latter defense of free
will, rather than a metaphysical theory. Indeed, he explicitly denies that a theoretical solution to
the problem of free will is possible, and claims that all that is left once this is recognized, is to
defend the idea of freedom; “to repel the objections of those who… boldly declare that freedom is
impossible” (GMS, 4: 459).1 In what follows I will present Kant’s account of free will and argue
that it is best understood not as a theoretical metaphysical solution to the problem of free will, but
as a defense of the idea of free will.

1

All references to Kant’s work refer to the Akadamie pagination; all translations used appear in the
Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant.
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In §1 I will briefly outline Kant’s account of free will. In §2 I will present the dilemma that
faces his account if we take it to be a theoretical solution. In §3 I will turn to consider Allen Wood’s
interpretation of Kant’s account of free will. Wood’s interpretation is one of the most sophisticated
interpretations to argue that Kant’s account should be understood as a theoretical explanation of
freedom. He deals directly with the role that causation plays in Kant’s account, which is crucial to
understanding the dilemma I raise in §2. I will argue that even his interpretation of Kant does not
get around the dilemma. Finally, in §4, I will argue that we should not understand Kant’s account
as a theoretical solution at all. Rather, his account should be understood as a defense of the idea of
freedom, which merely attempts to safeguard our presupposition that we are free.

2

KANT’S ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM AND CAUSATION

The problem of free will arises for Kant because of a tension between what he terms
“causality as natural necessity” and “causality as freedom” (KpV, 5: 94). The former, is a kind of
causation that is grounded in, and necessitated by, prior causes and conditions in time. The latter
is a kind of causation that is not grounded in any prior cause and exists outside of time.2 Kant
explains the distinction between the two kinds of causality in the following way, “The concept of
causality as natural necessity, as distinguished from the concept of causality as freedom, concerns
only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time and hence as appearances, as
opposed to their causality as things in themselves” (KpV, 5: 94). He claims that from the concept
of causality as natural necessity “it follows that every event, and consequently every action that

2

Essentially, the concept of natural necessity is like that of the contemporary concept of ‘causal
determinism’ and the concept of freedom that Kant is working with is similar to a libertarian, or agent
causal concept of freedom. However, I will continue to use his terms to refer to these two concepts.
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takes place at a point of time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time”
(KpV, 5: 94).
The core issue, for Kant, is one of control. The tension between these two concepts of
causality is that, if we were to consider an agent as existing solely in time, then that agent would
be governed by causality as natural necessity. The problem with considering an agent as existing
solely in time is that every action that such an agent performs would be caused by events in the
past outside of her control, and thus she would lack the kind of control over her actions Kant
believes is necessary for free will. He claims that if an agent existed solely in time as an
appearance, then freedom for that agent would be impossible: “if one takes the determinations of
the existence of things in time for determinations of things in themselves, then the necessity in the
causal relation can in no way be united with freedom” (KpV, 5: 94); “if appearances are things in
themselves, then freedom cannot be saved” (A536/B564). For an agent to have the kind of control
over her actions necessary to be considered free, she must be able to govern her actions through
causation as freedom. Freedom, on Kant’s account, “must be thought as independent from
everything empirical and so from nature generally” because “without this freedom…, no moral
law is possible and no imputation in accordance with it” (KpV 5: 97). What is at stake, For Kant,
is our ability to act according to the moral law, which commands necessarily, and allows us to
impute moral responsibility to ourselves and others. He sees natural necessity as, at least prima
facie, conflicting with freedom in so far as it robs the agent of control over her actions. Thus, Kant
attempts to show that no contradiction exists between causation as natural necessity and causation
as freedom: “Philosophy must therefore assume that no true contradiction will be found between
freedom and natural necessity… for it cannot give up the concept of nature any more than that of
freedom” (GMS, 4: 456).

4

Kant supposes that there are two main paths to removing the contradiction that seems to
exist between causality as natural necessity, which I will refer to as empirical causation, and
causality as freedom, which I will refer to as intelligible causation. The first path is to “except
[agents] from the law of natural necessity” (KpV, 5: 95). However, this path is a nonstarter because
to except agents from the law of natural necessity is “tantamount to handing [freedom] over to
blind chance” (KpV, 5: 95). Natural necessity ensures regularity among the objects of appearance
because it adheres to strict causal laws which we can observe and understand. To except agents
from natural necessity would be to remove any chance of regularity in their actions, and would be
the same as giving up the idea of natural necessity (at least as it applies to agents). Neither of these
results are acceptable.
The second, and for Kant, the only path to removing the seeming contradiction between
freedom and natural necessity, is “to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in
time, and so too its causality in accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance,
and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing in itself” (KpV, 5: 95). Kant says that “the
natural necessity which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject attaches merely to the
determinations of a thing which stands under conditions of time and so only to the determinations
of the acting subject as appearance” (KpV, 5: 97). That is, natural necessity applies to an agent’s
actions only when the agent considers herself as existing in time. Furthermore, she can take up
another point of view towards herself, such that “the very same subject, being on the other side
conscious of himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under
conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason”
(KpV, 5: 97). Kant expands on this explanation by saying that for the agent, when viewed as
existing outside the conditions of time, “nothing is… antecedent to the determination of his will,

5

but every action…is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but
the consequence… of his causality as a noumenon” (KpV, 5: 97-98). “Thus,” he continues, “the
intelligible cause… is outside the series [of events in time]; its effects, on the contrary, are
encountered in the series of empirical conditions. The effect, therefore can be regarded as free with
regard to its intelligible cause, and yet simultaneously, in regard to appearances, as their result
according to the necessity of nature” (A537/B565). Moreover, Kant claims that when we consider
agents as intelligible objects, “nothing hinders us from ascribing to this [intelligible] object…
another causality that is not appearance even though its effect is encountered in appearance” where
this other causality is to be understood as intelligible causality (A538-39/B566-67).
So, it is from the point of view in which we understand an agent as existing outside the
conditions of time, as an intelligible object, that we may understand the agent as being completely
and radically free, and possessed of intelligible causality. Kant’s solution to the problem of free
will is to make a distinction between the agent considered as appearance, or as existing in time,
and the agent considered as thing in itself, or intelligible object existing outside of time, and to
ascribe to each point of view a unique kind of causation. When an agent is considered as an
appearance or an empirical object existing in time, that agent is governed by natural necessity,
such that “if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind…
that we would know every incentive to action… we could calculate a human being’s conduct for
the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse” (KpV, 5: 99). When we consider an
agent as an intelligible object existing outside of time, we can understand all the actions that that
agent performs as being caused by intelligible causes which allows the agent “to act from itself,
without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action”
(A533/B561). The resulting account of free will removes the seeming contradiction between
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natural necessity and freedom by considering two ways in which we may understand an agent, and
by ascribing a distinct type of causality to each point of view.
One might be tempted to understand Kant’s account of free will as offering a theoretical
explanation of how agents may actually have free will. On this view, the account seems to state
that every agent has some sort of dual existence, intelligible and empirical, and that every action
an agent takes is governed by two distinct kinds of causation; one sort of causation as viewed from
within time, empirical causation, and another sort of causation as viewed from outside of time,
intelligible causation. I think that this interpretation of Kant’s discussion of free will is incorrect.
If we interpret Kant in this way his account of free will is incoherent, as I will show in the next
two sections. But despite the incoherence of his account, Kant still offers us a viable defense of
the idea of freedom, which I will take up in §4.

3

THE DILEMMA OF CAUSATION

If we take Kant’s account described above as a theoretical solution to the problem of free
will it faces a dilemma. The dilemma addresses the question of just how these two distinct kinds
of causation can both explain an agent’s actions. There are at least two ways of interpreting the
account as it has been articulated above, and it seems to me that neither interpretation is a viable
option for Kant, who not only wishes to assert that agents are free in a robust sense (cf.
A533/B561), but also that natural necessity governs all events in time and allows humans to gain
scientific knowledge of the world, and so is also indispensable.

7

3.1

The First Horn: Overdetermination
One interpretation of Kant’s account of free will, which is described briefly in Pereboom

(2006), is that both the empirical and the intelligible causes are sufficient causes of an action by
an agent. We might understand Kant’s account of free will, on this interpretation, as saying that
both the intelligible and the empirical causes bring about one and the same action at the same time,
and it is in virtue of the intelligible cause that the agent is free. This would seem to be a viable
interpretation of the above account. After all, Kant seems to suggest just this kind of picture when
he assures the reader that, considered as merely an appearance existing in time, an agent’s actions
are fully determined by prior events in time, and that, considered as an intelligible object, an
agent’s actions are determined by a timeless cause. The question he takes himself to be answering
is whether “both [empirical causality and intelligible causality], each in a different relation, might
be able to take place simultaneously in one and the same occurrence” (A536/B564 emphasis added
to ‘simultaneously’). Thus, one natural way to interpret his account is to think of both the empirical
and the intelligible causes as being sufficient causal explanations of an agent’s action.
However, this interpretation runs into a problem immediately. If we are to understand
Kant’s account as saying that both the empirical and intelligible causes are sufficient explanations
for an agent’s actions, and that both are present simultaneously in the same occurrence, then it
seems that an agent’s actions are always overdetermined. Pereboom concurs, saying that “…at
least on [this interpretation], it would seem that… an event in the empirical or phenomenal world
is overdetermined in a peculiar way” (2006: 551). Overdetermination describes when two distinct
yet sufficient causes simultaneously bring about one and the same event. On Kant’s account, both
intelligible causation and empirical causation are sufficient to bring about an agent’s action. When
we consider a particular action performed by an agent, and wonder what caused her to perform
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this action, we would have to answer that it was both the empirical cause located in time and
governed by natural necessity, and the intelligible cause located outside of time and associated
with the agent as intelligible object. Indeed, “by one strand of its causal history [an] empirical
action has a sufficient cause in an [intelligible subject], while by another strand this same action
has a sufficient cause in a deterministic series of events that traces back to a time before the
(empirical) agent was born” (Pereboom 2006: 551-2). To say this, however, is just to say that the
agent’s actions are overdetermined; that both natural necessity, and the intelligible causation of
the agent are each a sufficient cause for an agent’s actions.
However, if natural necessity and the chain of empirical causes are a sufficient explanation
for every action an agent performs, then it is hard to see how the intelligible cause adds any sort
of control or freedom to the agent. If my act of picking the bunch of green grapes instead of the
bunch of red grapes can be sufficiently explained by reference to only the empirical causes that
necessitated my action, then the fact that I was also contributing some sort of intelligible cause to
my action seems to have no impact or effect on my action. The antecedent empirical events which
necessitated my picking the green grapes are sufficient to bring about my actually picking the
green grapes, regardless of the presence of my intelligible causation. If we already have a sufficient
explanation for why I picked the green grapes which does not include a reference to any intelligible
causation or freedom on my part, then it appears the intelligible causation that Kant posits to secure
freedom does not actually provide an agent with any more control over her actions. There is no
sense in which my intelligible causation is more sufficient than the empirical causes which
necessitate my action, and thereby allows me to assert that it was due to my intelligible causation,
and this causation alone, which caused me to pick the green grapes instead of the red grapes. If our
actions are truly overdetermined, as this interpretation would have it, then both causes are equally
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sufficient causes of my actions. Since this is the case, it appears the intelligible causation that
agents possess does not secure freedom so long as empirical causes are equally sufficient causes
of their action. I would have picked the bunch of green grapes whether my intelligible causation
was present or not, and even in the case where my intelligible causation is present, it still does not
seem to add any sort of control to my action.
On Kant’s view, an agent lacks freedom just in case the cause of her actions is empirical
and lies outside of her control in the past. This is precisely the situation he claims we are in when
we regard agents as merely appearances in time. It is in virtue of the agent’s status as an intelligible
object which allows her the kind of control necessary over her actions to be free of the necessity
of empirical causes (cf. KpV 5: 96-7). However, if both sorts of causes are sufficient to bring about
an agent’s action, and indeed we are led to believe that both causes may stand as sufficient
explanations of her action, then it is hard to see how she has the kind of control over her actions
that Kant asserts she has. It seems to me that, regardless of the presence or absence of the agent’s
intelligible causation, if we can sufficiently explain the agent’s actions by referring solely to
empirical causes, then the agent’s actions are out of her control for precisely the reasons that Kant
gives above.
Beyond the mere fact that overdetermination would not secure freedom of the will, Kant
cannot accept overdetermination as a viable causal explanation of an agent’s actions for purely
theoretical reasons.3 Although much of what Kant says about the relationship between empirical
causes and intelligible causes implies that both are sufficient causes of an agent’s actions, and both
occur simultaneously in one and the same occurrence, such a view seems impossible given Kant’s
explanation of intelligible causes, which are causes that can only be attributed to agents insofar as

3

I am indebted to Eddy Nahmias for pointing out this criticism of Kant’s account to me.
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they are things in themselves existing outside of time. But for overdetermination to obtain, the two
causes which bring about the same effect must happen simultaneously. It is difficult to understand
how a cause which is supposed to exist outside of time could happen simultaneously with a cause
which exists solely in time.
However, Kant implies that intelligible causes are sufficient causes of an agent’s actions
when he says that “in [the agent’s existence outside of time] nothing is…antecedent to the
determination of his will, but every action…is to be regarded… as nothing but the consequence…
of his causality as noumenon” (KpV, 5: 97 emphasis added). Furthermore, in the first Critique,
Kant is concerned with “whether… every effect in the world must arise either from nature or
freedom, or whether instead both… might be able to take place simultaneously in one and the same
occurrence” (A536/B564 emphasis added). He answers this question by asserting that, indeed, both
empirical causes and intelligible causes bring about one and the same occurrence (A537/B565).
Thus, it appears he is suggesting that every action that an agent performs is caused by not only the
empirical causes which exist in time, but also by the intelligible causes which exist outside of time.
But such a picture is unavailable, since it implies that the timeless intelligible cause could somehow
occur simultaneously with empirical causes. It is not clear to me how something which is said to
exist outside of time could occur simultaneously with anything.
If we are to interpret Kant’s account of free will as a theoretical solution and thus claiming
that both intelligible and empirical causes are sufficient explanations of an agent’s actions, then
his account of free will asserts that an agent’s actions are always overdetermined by two distinct
causes. Thus, the account would seem to not secure free will, since the role of intelligible causes,
through which an agent has the kind of control over her actions necessary to be free, begins to look
superfluous. Beyond intelligible causes being superfluous on this interpretation, it seems that his
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account does not allow for such overdetermination to exist in the first place, since intelligible
causes exist outside of time, and as a result could not occur simultaneously with anything. It seems
to me that this interpretation of Kant’s account does not secure free will for agents and is
theoretically inconsistent. It is therefore not a viable interpretation of the account.

3.2

The Second Horn: Denying Natural Necessity
A second way to interpret Kant’s account of free will, which has been articulated by Allison

(1990, 2004) and Wood (1984), is to assume that each point of view from which we may consider
an agent gives only part of the whole causal story. On this interpretation, we might understand
Kant as saying that the empirical cause by itself is not entirely sufficient to bring about an agent’s
action, or if it is, it is possible for an agent to override empirical causation to bring about an event
“contrary to [empirical causation’s] force and influence” (A534/B562). In either case, the empirical
cause is only a part of a more complex causal explanation for why an agent acted in the way that
she did; the empirical cause “leaves room,” so to speak, for the agent’s intelligible cause to fully
determine the agent’s action, or else it can be overridden. That is, the empirical causes of an agent’s
actions would be considered insufficient causes of the agent’s actions. Empirical causes, therefore,
would not be the cause of an agent’s actions by themselves. Instead, one would need to also analyze
the agent’s intelligible existence to gain an understanding of the intelligible causes which actually
bring about the agent’s actions.
On this picture, we would be taking seriously the idea that to understand an agent as an
empirical object is to understand the agent only partially, and that to gain a full understanding of
an agent would be not only to take up the empirical point of view towards the agent, but also to
consider the agent as an intelligible object capable of acting through intelligible causes. Thus, we
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might even say that to understand an agent from a purely intelligible point of view is also to
understand the agent only partially. It is not until we view an agent’s actions from both the
empirical and the intelligible point of view that we gain a full understanding of why an agent acted
the way she acted. Allison refers to this interpretation as the “two aspect view” and “reduced to its
bare essentials, this interpretation of Kant… holds that the distinction [between intelligible and
empirical worlds] is not primarily between two kinds of entity, appearances and things in
themselves, but rather between two distinct ways in which the objects of human experience may
be ‘considered’ in philosophical reflection, namely, as they appear and as they are in themselves”
(2004: 3-4).
If we understand this interpretation as merely a kind of conceptual or epistemic framework
within which we can gain a deeper understanding of agents, rather than a metaphysical explanation
of how agents are actually free, then I think it is closer to Kant’s actual position (which I describe
and defend in §4). However, if we take this interpretation to be a metaphysical explanation for
how agents are actually free, then it is not much better than the interpretation presented in §2.1.
To interpret Kant’s account in this way is just to deny that natural necessity applies to human
agents. If empirical causes are not the sufficient causes of an agent’s actions, from any point of
view, then this interpretation seems to rob empirical causes of the sufficiency that Kant assumes
that they have when he describes natural necessity. For example, on this interpretation, if we were
to enquire as to why an agent acted in a particular way, and to answer that question we looked at
all and only the empirical events in time that preceded her action, we would not find a sufficient
causal explanation for why she acted as she did. Something crucial to the explanation of her
behavior would be missing. The reason we would not have a sufficient explanation for the agent’s
actions is that the empirical cause is only a part of the story on this interpretation, and thus could
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not in principle ever be a sufficient causal explanation on its own. One would only gain a fully
sufficient causal explanation for an agent’s actions by also examining the intelligible causes which
flowed from her intelligible existence, in addition to the empirical causes.
It is important to note here that if empirical causes are no longer sufficient on their own to
explain an agent’s actions, then Kant must deny his own statement that “if it were possible for us
to have such deep insight into a human being’s cast of mind… that we would know every incentive
to action… we could calculate a human being’s conduct for the future with as much certainty as a
lunar or solar eclipse” (KpV, 5: 99), and to deny this, is just to deny that natural necessity applies
to human agents. In Kant’s discussion of free will, things such as incentives, desires, motivations,
and the like, are all empirical phenomena which are strictly located in time and thus are excluded
from the intelligible world. These incentives, desires, motivations, and the like, are the empirical
causes of an agent’s actions. However, if empirical causes provide only partial causal explanations
for an agent’s actions, and to gain a complete explanation we would need to account for the agent’s
intelligible causes as well, which act through the agent’s reason, then it would not be the case that
if we knew everything about the empirical causes of her actions we would be able to predict all
her future actions with mathematical certainty. Something would be missing from the explanation,
namely the causal efficacy of the intelligible causes through the agent’s reason.
Kant cannot afford to deny that natural necessity applies to humans. Natural necessity is
the basis for all scientific knowledge about the world. It is the mechanism through which science
can provide definite answers to the questions it poses and it is the presence of natural necessity
which enables our experience of the empirical world to be coherent and understandable. It is
precisely because the world we experience follows definite laws of cause and effect that we can
make sense of the world at all, according to Kant (GMS, 4: 455). So, if one were to deny that
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natural causes were sufficient to bring about an agent’s actions, one would effectively be denying
natural necessity. This is not a route available to Kant, since to deny natural necessity is to deny
our ability to do science, and worse yet, to deny our ability to make sense of our experiences at all.
Thus, the second interpretation of Kant’s account does not seem to be a viable interpretation either.

4

WOOD—INTELLIGIBLE CAUSATION AND EMPIRICAL CAUSATION

Allen Wood (1984) presents an interpretation of Kant’s account that, on the surface, seems
to be a viable response to the dilemma raised in the last section. Wood’s interpretation relies on a
passage in which Kant says that practical freedom
presupposes that… an action’s cause in [the empirical world] is not so determining as to
preclude a causality lying in our will, a causality which, independently of these natural
causes and even contrary to their force and influence, can bring about something
determined in the temporal order according to empirical laws, and thus can begin a series
of events wholly of itself. (A534/B562).
Wood then presents his interpretation of this passage, saying:
Kant’s theory apparently holds that because [empirical objects] are not things in
themselves, nature is not the complete and self-sufficient cause of events, at least not
human actions. Rather, the complete and self-sufficient cause of actions is our free will,
located in the intelligible world. Nature, in the form of sensuous impulses, enters into the
production of our actions only insofar as we freely permit sensuous motives to be
substituted for a priori rational principles in determining our choices (1984: 87).
Thus, on Wood’s reading of Kant, empirical causes are not sufficient causes of an agent’s
actions at all, but are merely the result of the agent’s will, or existence as an intelligible object.
The intelligible causes stand as the only sufficient causes of an agent’s actions, or else the agent
allows empirical causes to determine her actions by means of her intelligible being. So, it appears
that on Wood’s interpretation, an agent’s actions are always ultimately caused by her free will, in
some sense or other, which we must understand as merely intelligible and existing outside of time.
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Furthermore, empirical causes are efficacious in bringing about an agent’s actions only insofar as
she allows such empirical causes to govern her actions.
I believe that Wood’s interpretation of Kant’s account of free will is essentially an embrace
of the second horn of the dilemma presented in §2.2, and thus is not a viable interpretation. If
empirical causes are not complete and self-sufficient causes of an agent’s actions, as Wood
suggests, then empirical causes are not real, but merely apparent, causes of our actions and the real
sufficient causes of our actions actually lie in the intelligible world. Beyond this, Wood’s
interpretation implies that natural necessity, as Kant conceives of it, is false, at least as it concerns
human beings. But as was stated in §2.2, Kant cannot give up the idea that natural necessity applies
to humans without contradicting himself and calling into question whether humans are fully a part
of the natural order of things. It may be the case that Kant has in fact contradicted himself, however,
I am willing to take him at his word when he says that we “cannot give up the concept of nature
any more than that of freedom” (GMS, 4: 456). Given that Kant in this quotation is explicit about
not willing to give up the idea of nature, or natural necessity, we should be suspicious of other
statements he makes which imply that natural necessity has been denied, as is the case with the
quotation in A534/B562, which Wood uses to support his interpretation of Kant.
Wood is aware of this line of objection to his interpretation, and suggests that his
interpretation of Kant does not actually have the consequences just described. Wood states,
“It is tempting to describe Kant’s theory by saying that the natural empirical causes of
actions […] are not real causes but only apparent; furthermore, that on this theory
everything in the phenomenal world goes on […] just as if our actions were caused by
antecedent events, but in reality their causes lie outside of nature altogether…” (1984: 87).
He rebuts this line of thinking by stating that, “Kant would reject this description of his
theory” because, “Kant’s principle of empirical causality says that every event in time is
determined by antecedent events according to necessary laws” and that “every human action does
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conform to this principle” (Wood 1984: 87). The idea is that, so long as human actions conform to
the principle of empirical causation as described by Kant, every human action, when viewed as an
event in time and space, is the result of empirical causes. The only caveat being that these empirical
causes are not the complete and self-sufficient causes of human actions. Thus, Wood claims that
empirical causes are real, not merely apparent, causes of an agent’s actions so long as any causes
of the agent’s actions conform with Kant’s principle of empirical causation, despite empirical
causes not being the self-sufficient causes of the agent’s actions. And furthermore, Wood thinks
that these empirical causes of an agent’s actions still leave some room over for the agent’s
intelligible cause to bring about their action, thus securing free will for the agent.
I think Wood’s response to the line of objection I raised above fails for two reasons. The
first reason why Wood’s response fails is that Kant’s principle of empirical causes is more specific
than Wood suggests. Wood characterizes Kant’s principle of empirical causation as merely
“determined by antecedent events according to necessary laws,” but Kant himself provides a more
specific definition of the principle in the second Critique. He states, “The concept of causality as
natural necessity… concerns only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time…
from [this] it follows that every event, and consequently every action that takes place at a point of
time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time” (KpV, 5: 94). As we can
see from this quotation, Kant does not characterize empirical causation as flowing from any
antecedent event according to necessary laws, but is explicit about such antecedent events and
their effects being located in time. If intelligible causes are the self-sufficient causes of an agent’s
actions, as Wood suggests, then the causes of the agent’s actions do not, in fact, conform with
Kant’s principle of empirical causality.
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Wood seems to have distorted Kant’s theory of empirical causation to try to reconcile
Kant’s account of intelligible causation with his account of empirical causation. In defining
empirical causation as simply “determined by antecedent events according to necessary laws”
Wood has eliminated time from Kant’s principle, which plays a crucial role in the concept of
natural necessity. For Kant, empirical causation is a much more robust principle than antecedent
events determining their causes in conformity with a necessary law. For something to be
empirically caused the antecedent event that determines the subsequent event must be located in
time. But as Wood admits, an agent’s intelligible causes are not located in time and since they are
not located in time, Wood’s account of intelligible causes runs directly contrary to Kant’s principle
of empirical causation, even though Wood seems to claim that this is not the case. If Wood’s
proposal were the picture of freedom that Kant held, then it would not be the case that our actions
had empirical causes, precisely because the sufficient causes of the agent’s actions would be
intelligible causes, i.e. causes outside of time.
The second reason why Wood’s response fails is that Wood identifies empirical causes as
lacking sufficiency in the case of human actions which seems to imply that natural necessity does
not apply to human beings, a result which Kant cannot accept. If the empirical inclinations and
motivations which drive an agent to action, when viewed as an appearance in time, are not
complete and self-sufficient causes of that agent’s actions, it is difficult to understand how exactly
natural necessity applies to an agent at all. Recall that, according to Kant, natural necessity would
allow an observer with perfect knowledge of an individual’s motivations and inclinations, to
predict with mathematical certainty every future action of that individual considered as
appearance. Given this statement, even if human beings are not merely appearances but something
more, one would expect that when observing an agent from an empirical point of view, their
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inclinations and motivations would be the sufficient and complete causes of all their future actions.
If they weren’t, it would be very hard to understand exactly how full knowledge of the agent’s
inclinations and motivations would yield the kind of predictive power that Kant claims such
knowledge would yield.
Thus, by eliminating the sufficiency of empirical causes to make room for the sufficiency
of intelligible causes Wood’s interpretation of Kant is simply an embrace of the second horn of
the dilemma presented in §2.2. By claiming that empirical causes are not complete or selfsufficient causes of an agent’s actions, Wood does indeed secure free will for an agent, but the cost
is not one that Kant would pay. If empirical causes are not self-sufficient causes of an agent’s
actions, then we cannot say that natural necessity applies to that agent. And if it is indeed the case
that natural necessity no longer applies to human agents, as Wood’s interpretation seems to
suggest, then the problem of free will would never arise in the first place, and it would seem to
follow that no science of human behavior could ever exist.
Furthermore, Wood’s interpretation seems to introduce a sort of dualism into Kant’s theory
overall, where some objects, like billiard balls, are subject to natural necessity and other objects,
namely human beings, are exempt from natural necessity. Given that Kant takes all objects to have
both an intelligible and empirical aspect, Wood’s interpretation also forces one to consider whether
any object is subject to natural necessity at all, or whether the phenomena we observe in the
empirical world are just the result of hidden intelligible causes, and any empirical explanation that
we may give to explain such phenomena is hopelessly confused and incomplete. Although Kant
might indeed think that any empirical explanation of phenomena is incomplete, this only serves to
cut against the claim that Kant’s account of free will is some sort of theoretical explanation of how
agents actually have free will.
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Any one of these implications of Wood’s interpretation of Kant is unacceptable given the
parameters Kant has set in place for himself. Taken together, they reveal the deep conceptual
problem that plagues Kant’s account of free will. Although there are a host of other viable
interpretations of his account of free will which I have not considered here, if we focus solely on
the causal account of free will and the range of interpretations I have presented here, it appears
that Kant’s account, if understood as a causal and theoretical explanation of free will, is plagued
with deep conceptual problems and inconsistencies. I simply do not see any way for Kant to assert
that both empirical and intelligible causes are sufficient causes of an agent’s action without falling
into overdetermination, or without somehow limiting the efficacy of the empirical causes—options
which run roughshod over the parameters he has set for himself and his theorizing. Thus, it is my
view that Kant’s account, if understood as a theoretical solution to the problem of free will, is
simply incoherent.

5

KANT’S DEFENSE OF FREEDOM

As I argued above, if we understand Kant’s account of free will as offering some sort of
theoretical explanation for the reality of free will, such an account is incoherent. Here I will argue
that we should not understand his account as providing a theoretical explanation for the
metaphysical reality of free will. Instead we should take his account as merely providing room for
the idea of freedom for practical purposes. In my defense of this deflationary reading of Kant’s
account, I wish to set aside the question of whether more metaphysically robust readings of his
account (such as Langton: 1998, Strawson: 1966, Guyer: 1987, Allison: 2004) may also be useful
in the same way. My interpretation of Kant’s account takes its inspiration from John Rawls (2003)
and Jonathan Bennett (1984).
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Kant is aware that a theoretical explanation of free will which attempts to reconcile freedom
of the will with natural necessity via a causal theory involving intelligible causes and empirical
causes is a difficult task to accomplish. He even harbors some doubt about whether such an
enterprise could ever succeed claiming, “freedom is only an idea of reason, the objective reality
of which is doubtful” (GMS, 4: 455). Furthermore, he is careful to note that his account has “not
been trying to establish the reality of freedom” nor has he “even tried to prove the possibility of
freedom” (A557-58/B585-86). Rather, “freedom is treated here only as a transcendental idea,
through which reason thinks of the series of conditions in appearance starting absolutely through
what is sensibly unconditioned” (A558/B586 emphasis mine). And this idea of freedom is, “the
independence of our reason from the order of nature and thus of the spontaneity of pure reason”
(Rawls 2003: 288, cf. KPV 5: 132).
The sorts of things that may be explained theoretically, according to Kant, are the empirical
phenomena we encounter in experience. Freedom is not directly encountered in experience and so
lies outside the boundary of things which can be explained theoretically. As such, it is merely an
idea which must be defended: “Now, where determination by laws of nature ceases, there all
explanation ceases as well, and nothing is left but defense, that is, to repel the objections of those
who pretend to have seen deeper into the essence of things and therefore boldly declare that
freedom is impossible” (GMS, 4: 459). Natural necessity poses a threat to the idea of freedom
insofar as it implies that freedom is impossible. So, one way of understanding what Kant is trying
to do in his discussion of free will is to defend our conviction that we are free, from the threat
posed to it by natural necessity.
So, it seems that we should not take his account of free will as providing some sort of
metaphysical explanation of the reality of free will. Rather, it seems that Kant’s account is meant
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to be taken as merely the defense of the idea of freedom, an idea which Kant thinks is fundamental
to our being human, and understanding ourselves as such. When we understand his account in this
way, we see that rather than making metaphysical claims about the nature of reality and of agents,
Kant is simply arguing that if we take up different points of view towards an agent—an intelligible
point of view and an empirical point of view—natural necessity is no longer a threat to the idea of
freedom, and we can accommodate both ideas. Taking up these two points of view toward agents
does not mean that we must understand agents as actually divided between two worlds, nor does
it mean that we have proved the reality of freedom. It simply means that we may accommodate
the idea of freedom in our understanding of ourselves without that idea conflicting with our
understanding of natural necessity, and vice versa.
It is helpful to get clear on what Kant means by defense here. One natural way of construing
what he means by this is to think of constructing a theoretical justification for freedom. However,
as we have just seen, this is not what Kant intends to do. His skepticism about the viability of any
theoretical explanation of freedom is enough to show us that constructing a theoretical justification
for the idea of freedom could not be what he has in mind. What he means by providing a defense
of the idea of freedom is more of an act of protecting the idea of freedom from theoretical attacks
which attempt to show that freedom is impossible. That is, he does not want to show that freedom
is not impossible, but instead he wants to show that any argument that claims freedom is impossible
cannot succeed.
Rawls has a particularly clear and insightful summary of the meaning of defense in Kant’s
practical philosophy stating that, “Kant views philosophy of defense… as the defense of our faith
in reason and the reasonable faith that sustains it. While we cannot give a theoretical proof of the
possibility of freedom, it suffices to assure ourselves that there is no such proof of its impossibility”
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(2003: 324). Indeed, Kant himself claims that, “no insight can be had into the possibility of the
freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the sensible world: we are fortunate if only we can be
sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now forced to assume it”
(KPV 5: 94). Thus, when Kant claims that he has not tried to prove the reality, nor even the
possibility of freedom, but merely to defend the idea of freedom, it is this sense of defense that he
has in mind. As Rawls continues, “It is essential to see that Kant is not presenting an argument that
the beliefs of reasonable faith [of which freedom is one such belief] are true by the criteria of
empirical and scientific truth; it is not his intention to lay out evidence aimed at making a
convincing theoretical case” rather, “he presents instead considerations showing why we are
entitled to affirm those beliefs” (2003: 325).4
The considerations that Kant presents to show why we are entitled to presuppose the idea
of freedom are our capacity to deliberate, and our imputation of moral responsibility to ourselves
and to others. When presenting these considerations, Kant’s main argument is that we cannot make
sense of deliberation, nor can we make sense of our imputing moral responsibility to ourselves and
to others, without first presupposing the idea of freedom. Indeed, “the footpath of freedom is the
only one on which it is possible to make use of our reason in our conduct” (GMS, 4: 455-56). And
as a result, the idea of freedom is “practically necessary – that is necessary in idea, without any
further condition – for a rational being who is conscious of his causality through reason and so of
a will (which is distinct from desires)” (GMS, 4: 461).

4

Although Kant does attempt to provide at least the framework of a theoretical case, as was
shown in the previous two sections, this theoretical case is incoherent and should be abandoned.
Furthermore, Kant’s defense of free will does not seem to depend on the merits of his theoretical
case.

23

Kant provides two examples to illustrate these considerations, and defend freedom as a
practically necessary idea. The first example is the ‘gallows example’ (KPV 5: 30). It is an
empirical fact that we can and often do deliberate about how to act in a given situation, and the
gallows example is meant to illustrate how reason is used by an agent in deliberation to cause
himself to act, in spite of his impulses and inclinations. In this example, a man is asked to give
false testimony against some other honorable man for political reasons, or face death by hanging.
Kant claims that in such a situation the man confronted with this choice between giving false
testimony and hanging, would at least find it possible to “overcome his love of life” so that he may
act in a way that conforms with the moral law, i.e. not give false testimony (KpV 5: 30). In this
example, we see that the man is confronted, on the one hand, with strong desires and inclinations
to save his own life and violate the moral law by giving false testimony, and on the other hand, he
is confronted with his duty to the moral law, which reason presents to him and which requires that
he not give false testimony against the honorable man.
The upshot of this example is that despite the man’s inclinations and desires, which can
cause him to give false testimony, his reason, as distinct from his desires, can cause him to act in
such a way that he does not violate the moral law. He is capable of not giving false testimony
because he infers that it would be wrong to do so. This inference that it would be wrong to give
false testimony, is based in the man’s ability to consider different possible future actions as
radically open to him. Reason reveals to the man different possible actions to take; it makes its
own order which has not yet occurred and leaves it up to the man to decide how to act. Indeed,
“reason does not give in to those grounds which are empirically given… but makes its own order
according to ideas, to which it declares actions to be necessary that have not yet occurred… [and]
presuppose[es] of all such actions that reason can have causality in relation to them” (A548/B576).
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Kant claims that the only way to make sense of the man’s reasoning causing him to act against his
impulses, is to presuppose that he is free, insofar as he can act on principles which do not have
their cause in the empirical world (i.e. they are not sensuous impulses, like the man’s love of life).
Instead, these principles have their cause in reason which we must think of as distinct from nature,
in some sense.
Kant’s second example is the ‘malicious liar’ example (A554-5/B582-3). This example is
used to show how, despite being able to give an empirical explanation for why a person was
determined to act wrongly, we still impute moral responsibility to them, which can only be
understood if we have presupposed the idea of freedom. In this example, Kant asks us to imagine
a person who has brought about a certain confusion in society by use of a malicious lie. He then
goes on to describe the sorts of judgement that we could make about this liar. He supposes that if
we were to investigate the reasons why the liar told his malicious lie, we would soon come up with
many empirical facts about the liar, such as his poor upbringing, the influence of bad friends, or
that the liar could not control his impulses and felt no shame in performing immoral acts. Kant
suggests that “even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless
blames the agent” (A555/B583). Furthermore, we do not blame the agent because of these causes,
but rather we blame the agent because we understand that the agent could have used his reason to
determine his actions instead of acting on the basis of his sensuous impulses. In short, we blame
him because we recognize that he could have acted for reasons wholly distinct from his desires
and inclinations but did not in fact do that. Kant claims that the only way to make sense of blaming
the malicious liar for his lie, is to assume that he could have acted on the basis of reason rather
than impulse alone. But to assume this is just to presuppose the idea of freedom.
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Thus, if we look at both the gallows example and the malicious liar example, we find that
the idea of freedom is everywhere presupposed. Indeed, Kant claims that “human being[s] can
never think of the causality of [their] own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for
independence from the determining causes of the world of sense is freedom” (GMS, 4: 452). In
both examples above, he illustrated what many of us presuppose when we act, namely, that we
have the ability to act on the basis of our impulses on the one hand, and an ability to act on the
basis of reason and principles on the other. And it is because we take ourselves to be able to act on
the basis of reason, as distinct from our impulses and inclinations, that we are free in a practical
sense, according to Kant. Indeed, since in both examples presented above the only way for us to
make sense of the agent’s ability to use their reason was to presuppose the idea of freedom, thus
demonstrating its practical necessity, he asserts that “every being that cannot act otherwise than
under the idea of freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect” (GMS 4: 448).
So, we can understand Kant’s defense of the idea of freedom as addressing two distinct
problems. The first problem is the conflict between natural necessity and our ability to deliberate
and act on the basis of that deliberation. “In a nutshell, deliberation involves viewing some
questions about the future as radically open, while [natural necessity] seems to imply that they are
all really closed” (Bennett 1984: 110). The second problem is the conflict between natural
necessity and our practice of imputing moral responsibility to ourselves and others. If natural
necessity is true, and that is all there is to the world, then it appears “our propensity to blame” and
impute moral responsibility to ourselves and others “can be made to look unfair by its being
brought up hard against the hypothesis of [natural necessity]” (Bennett 1984: 108). What Kant’s
defense of the idea of freedom is meant to do, is to assure us that despite a seeming conflict between
the idea of natural necessity and the idea of freedom, we can secure our conviction that we are free
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in a practical sense despite natural necessity. How he claims to secure this conviction is by making
a distinction between two points of view from which we may consider ourselves. One point of
view from which we consider ourselves an intelligible being outside of time, and another point of
view from which we consider ourselves as an empirical being in time.
This distinction between the intelligible point of view and the empirical point of view
applies differently to each of the two problems mentioned above. In the first case, when we
consider our ability to deliberate and act on the basis of that deliberation, “Kant invites us to
contrast (a) following the order of things as they present themselves with (b) framing for oneself
and order of one’s own and… acting under the idea of freedom” (Bennett 1984: 111). According
to Bennett, “(a) involves looking at one’s future not as a deliberating and deciding agent but rather
as a predicting self-observer who tries to work out what he will do by applying causal laws to his
known present condition” (1984: 111). In other words, (a) requires us to take up the empirical
point of view towards ourselves as agents. We must view ourselves as located in time and view
our actions as governed by natural necessity. Of course, the contrast with (a) is to take up another
point of view toward ourselves such that we are deliberating and deciding agents who can frame
an order of our own and act under the idea of freedom. It is by taking up this latter point of view
that we can consider ourselves free in a practical sense. Indeed, as Bennett argues
we do not know enough to [be predicting self-observers] … but we cannot be comfortable
with the thought that our practical deliberations are a pis aller, that our status as deliberating
agents is a pure product of our ignorance. This is what Kant offers to rescue us from. He is
saying that our deliberating stance is securely and deeply grounded [and] is not in danger
– even in principle – of being swept aside by an inrush of knowledge of our structure and
the laws that govern us (1984: 111).
Thus, we can understand Kant as saying that even though we are ignorant of many facts
about why we act in the ways we act, it is not merely this ignorance which sustains the conviction
that we are agents capable of deliberating and acting because of that deliberation. Kant claims that
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even if we had full knowledge of these facts we would still regard ourselves as capable of
determining our actions because of our deliberation. No amount of theoretical information can
show the idea of freedom to be impossible.
The argument that might be given in defense of this contrast is that “there may be narrow
limits on how much self-prediction it is in principle possible [for the agent] to do whether or not
[natural necessity] is true and however much knowledge [the agent] acquires” (Bennett 1984: 111).
That is, there may be facts about the agent which would be the basis of her prediction for how she
will act, such that, if the agent was thinking about her prediction, the facts about the agent would
no longer be an adequate basis for the agent’s predicting how she will act (Bennett 1984: 111).
Indeed, Gilbert Ryle, whose theory Bennett suggests is quite similar to Kant’s, puts the matter
nicely,
A prediction of a deed or thought is a higher order operation, the performance of which
cannot be among the things considered in making the prediction. Yet as the state of mind
in which I am just before I do something may make a difference to what I do, it follows
that I must overlook at least some of the data relevant to my prediction (1949: 176).
So even if an agent had full knowledge of all the facts necessary to make an accurate
prediction of what she will do next, the very act of making such a prediction would add a new fact
into the equation that would necessarily be overlooked by the agent making the prediction. Thus,
“a certain peculiarity in the notion of self-prediction serves as a barrier which – without invoking
noumenalist metaphysics – prevents the [thought of natural necessity] from conflicting” with the
thought that I am a deliberating agent who can frame a set of possible actions each of which are
open to me (Bennett 1984: 112). This peculiarity also allows for us to make an epistemic
distinction between ourselves as self-predicting observers completely governed by natural
necessity, and free deliberating agents. Something which is similar to the distinction Kant makes
between agents considered as intelligible beings and agents considered as empirical beings.
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In the second case, a similar argument to can be made when we consider our imputing
moral responsibility to ourselves and to others. Bennett suggests that one way of understanding
Kant’s defense of freedom is by considering a similar defense of freedom presented by P.F.
Strawson. Strawson considers the basis of our imputing moral responsibility to ourselves and
others as grounded in what he calls the personal reactive attitudes. These attitudes, which include
resentment and gratitude, among others, are subjective reactions that we have in response to the
actions of others and our actions, and their consequences (Strawson 1962: 186-8). This is
contrasted with what Strawson calls the objective attitude, which when taken up towards another
person “is to see him, perhaps as an object of social policy; as a subject for what… might be called
treatment… to be managed or handled or cured or trained…” (1962: 190). Bennett suggests that
“the personal reactive attitudes are… in conflict with the objective [empirical] attitude [point of
view] in which one seeks to gather the facts, to understand the situation, to discover the etiology
of the behavior so as to alter its chances of recurring” (1984: 110). Thus, the personal reactive
attitudes seem to conflict with the objective attitude. The latter can be understood as the empirical
point of view, which compels us to look at the causal history of an action and realize that what
occurred was just the result of natural forces necessitating certain outcomes, whereas the former
compels us to view the action as in some sense the doing of the agent herself. However, “it is not
that [natural necessity] logically conflicts with blameworthiness, but rather that the raising of the
question of [natural necessity] [i.e. looking into an action’s causal history] conflicts with the
feelings and attitudes that go into blame and make it what it is” (Bennett 1984: 109).
The upshot of this distinction is that both the reactive attitudes and the objective attitude
are useful and necessary in their own way. The objective attitude, when appropriate, allows us to
see an agent as affected by the causal conditions of the world, that is, as subject to natural necessity.
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And our reactive attitudes, when appropriate, allow us to impute moral responsibility to ourselves
and others which presupposes in some sense the idea of freedom. So, one way of understanding
Kant’s discussion of the idea of freedom and imputing moral responsibility to the malicious liar,
is that blaming the liar is an appropriate response in the situation despite us fully understanding
the empirical causal history that lead to the lie. Thus, as Strawson might argue, we have these
reactive attitudes towards ourselves and others regardless of whether natural necessity is true or
not (1962: 192-3).
Although Kant does not invoke the language of reactive attitudes, his theory is quite similar
to Strawson’s, as Bennett argues. Strawson’s theory “shares certain abstract features of Kant’s
[defense of] freedom” but “the big difference between Strawson and Kant is that whereas Kant’s
theory ties blameworthiness to a thought of ungiven facts [intelligible causes], Strawson says we
must go outside all the facts and introduce a dimension of feeling” (Bennett 1984: 110).
Indeed, both interpretations presented by Bennett cohere nicely with Kant’s project of
showing that no amount of theoretical knowledge can show that the idea of freedom is impossible.
Even in cases where know all the facts necessary to make an accurate prediction of our next action,
we will persist in thinking of ourselves as agents capable of deliberating and acting because of that
deliberation. Likewise, even if we know the whole causal history of the malicious liar’s life leading
up to his lie, we will still impute moral responsibility to him because of his ability to reason and
act according to those reasons. Our belief in the idea of freedom is not harmed by our knowing
empirical facts about the world.
Accordingly, how we accommodate for such a belief is by making an epistemic, as opposed
to ontological, distinction between ourselves as intelligible beings and ourselves as empirical
beings. If we think of ourselves as having not only empirical but intelligible aspects, we can make
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sense of how we are able to act under the idea of freedom in a practical sense. This, I claim, is the
real lesson at the heart of Kant’s discussion of free will. The distinction between the intelligible
and the empirical is simply an epistemic distinction which is meant to defend the idea of freedom
from being destroyed by theoretical knowledge, and from the thesis of natural necessity. By
thinking of ourselves as in some sense distinct from the natural order of things we can
accommodate the idea of freedom which helps us make sense of acting on the basis of reasons.
And by thinking of ourselves as a part of the natural order of things, we can recognize our role in
the world around us, order our experiences accordingly, and appreciate the world’s influence on
ourselves. These two points of view may not track an actual ontological distinction, but they help
us make sense of our own experience, our own humanity, and safeguard the idea of freedom.
Kant wants to safeguard our presupposition of the idea of freedom because he takes it to
be a fundamental aspect of our humanity, and rightly recognizes that it is the basis for our
conception of ourselves as agents and as morally responsible for our actions. Without these two
concepts, it would be hard for us to consider ourselves fully human. Indeed, our agency and
practices of imputing moral responsibility are so central to our humanity, Kant argues, that the
idea of freedom is a practical necessity. It is something we assume just in virtue of being human,
and for that reason alone, Kant takes up its defense.

6

CONCLUSION

Kant’s discussion of free will might be taken to be a theoretical account of how we are
actually free. If we understand him in this way, his theory is incoherent. I have tried to argue that
Kant is better understood as eschewing a theoretical account of free will in favor of a defense of
the idea of free will, in which he assumes the idea of freedom and defends it from those theories
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which attempt to show that freedom is impossible. My point is quite modest. I have set aside many
questions which still linger. One might wonder whether the sharp distinction Kant draws between
reason and our inclinations and impulses is correct, or whether our imputing moral responsibility
is sufficient to justify systems of retributive punishment. I have also left aside a discussion of the
limits of human knowledge which Kant makes note of throughout his work, and which is implicit
in his defense of freedom. These questions will have to be taken up in some other work.
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